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IN SEARCH OF A MODEL ACT FOR
PRISONERS' RIGHTS
FRED COHEN*
I. OVERVIEW
A first reading of A Model Act for the Protection of Rights of
Prisoners' (Model Act) is a melancholy experience. Regrettably, addi-
tional study and reflection only intensify the original mood. The Model
Act comes too late in the movement for prison reform to serve as a cata-
lyst for basic change. In its scope and content it is so limited, so ambigu-
ously expressed, so content with leaving undisturbed the basic power
arrangements between the inmate and the administration, that with
but one or two exceptions its only appeal will be to prison officials
fighting a rearguard action against the further "encroachment" of ju-
dicial decisions. Indeed, the Model Act lacks even the "menace of
liberal reform."2
The Model Act is brief, containing only seven sections, and I find
only two provisions in it which may be regarded as innovative. First,
in section 3(d) the Model Act prohibits the use of a solitary cell for
punishment. Solitary confinement is to be used only under conditions
of emergency, and even then under rather strict rules of substance
and procedure during the continuance of the emergency. The term
"emergency" relates to the protection of the inmate, prison personnel,
or other prisoners. While section 3 is fairly explicit on the conditions
of solitary confinement, rights of communication, duration of con-
finement, post-confinement approval, and record keeping, it is silent
concerning the specific criteria and procedures for determining whether
an "emergency" exists, and does not indicate who has the authority to
make this determination. 3 How one might distinguish solitary con-
* Professor of Law and Criminal Justice, School of Criminal Justice, State
University of New York at Albany. B.S., 1957, LL.B., 1960, Temple University;
LL.M., 1961, Yale University. Part of the research for this article was financed by the
National Science Foundation, Grant No. 20-477G.
I. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIIME AND DELINQUENCY, A MODEL ACT FOR THE
PROTECTION OF RIGHTS OF PRISONERS (1972) [hereinafter cited as MODEL ACT].
2. See Mitford, Book Review, N.Y. REV., March 9, 1972, at 29.
3. The "danger to self or others" formulation is scarcely adequate except as a
general guide. This type of formulation is characteristic of civil commitment laws
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finement from "administrative segregation," except for the euphe-
mism employed, also is unclear.
Thus, the Model Act fails to address some basic issues, and in opting
either for silence or for ambiguity leaves the inmate in very much the
same situation he is in without the proposed legislation. Should the
Model Act, or section 3 alone, be adopted anywhere, I predict that
although the operative language will be changed-by substituting
"emergency" for "punishment" or "discipline" 
-and although the basic
conditions of solitary confinement might improve, the frequency of such
confinement, and the characteristics of those confined, would not.
Secondly, section 5, "Grievance Procedure," may be read as a pro-
gressive step. The director of the state department of correction is
required under this section to establish a grievance procedure to which
all prisoners will have access. Any grievance, whether or not in vio-
lation of the Model Act, is to be investigated "by a person or agency
outside of the department," which then must submit a written report
to the department and the prisoner. This is, of course, a thinly dis-
guised and well-diluted attempt to create a correctional ombudsman.
Stipulating for the moment the desirability of such an ombudsman,
there are important issues concerning his function that the Model
Act does not iesolve: the measures to be taken to assure his inde-
pendence; the jurisdiction of his responsibilities; his power to investi-
gate, to inspect, and to affect administrative decisions; his qualifica-
tions; his confidentiality; and his relationship to the judiciary.4 Section
5 not only fails to address these issues but, in a most cynical fashion,
places on agency officials only the burden to establish the procedure
and to receive-not to act on-a "report of findings." Indeed, since
the director of the department of correction is to devise the procedure
as well as select a person or agency to perform the investigative func-
tion, it would be difficult for the director to resist the temptation to
establish only a simulated process. He could create the appearance of
change, and of being responsive to the claims of inmates, as well as
establish the groundwork for rather attractive answers for an inquisi-
tive attorney or court-all at practically no cost in power or time.
(which also typically add a "need for treatment" requirement), and such laws have
allowed psychiatrists and institutional personnel the widest latitude in arriving at
commitment and retention decisions. See N. KrrnuE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT:
DnviANcn AND ENFoRcED THERAPY 65-79 (1971).
4. See T. FizraARzAs, THE DEsIRAnrriTy OF A CORRECTIoNAL OMBUDSMAN 43-50
(1973).
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The architecture of the Model Act is fairly simple; its content other
than the two sections just discussed represents a response to an un-
explained, idiosyncratic selection of issues brought to light through
prisoners' rights litigation. The Model Act claims as its central princi-
ple a reiteration of the well-worn dictum of Coffin v. Reichard:5 A
prisoner "shall retain all rights of an ordinary citizen, except those
expressly or by necessary implication taken by law."'  Specific exam-
ples are given of the rights of prisoners which, in their totality, express
little more than the ancient principle that prison authorities are under
a duty to maintain the minimal conditions necessary to sustain the life
and health of prisoners. 7
In section 2 the Model Act, consistent with prevailing case law,'
proscribes the use of physical force against prisoners except for de-
fensive or preventive purposes. In the same section it also condemns,
as "inhumane treatment," the following: sexual assaults; punitive or
restrictive measures as retaliation for the assertion of rights; degrada-
tion of prisoners; and discriminatory treatment based on race, religion,
nationality, or political belief.
Section 4, "Disciplinary Procedure," is one of the most curious
provisions in the Model Act. In the first place, the section attempts
to deal with both procedure and substance under a single, and obvi-
ously misleading, heading. Secondly, it places the responsibility on
prison administrators to develop a fair and orderly disciplinary pro-
cedure, and thus opts to maximize administrative discretion. Thirdly,
the only operative principle the section announces concerning proce-
dure is that a hearing, with a right to counsel or "some other person"
selected by the prisoner, will be provided when the punishment which
may be imposed affects the prisoner's sentence or eligibility for parole.
Finally, in addition to its indefensible merger of substance and pro-
5. 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887 (1945).
6. MODEL ACT § 1(a).
7. See F. COHEN, THE LEGAL CHALLENGE TO CORRECTIONS 66 n.14 (1969), and
cases cited therein. Compare MODEL ACT § 1, with FOURTH UNrnD NATIONS CON-
GRESS ON PREVENTION OF CRIME AND TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS, STANDAI MINI-
MUM RULES FOR THE TREATMENT OF PRIsoNERS pt. 1, §§ 8-25 (1955). For example,
while the Model Act provides for "nutritious food in adequate quantities," the Standard
Minimum Rules provides for "food of nutritional value adequate for health and
strength, of wholesome quality and well prepared and served."
8. See Gonzales v. Rockefeller, 453 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1971); Jackson v. Bishop,
404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970),
supplementing 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969), affd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
Vol. 1973:621]
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cedure, the Model Act admonishes administrators to maintain "a high
standard of fairness and equity," and to prescribe-presumably in ad-
vance of their application-offenses and punishments.
An important point about section 4 is that it does not create a disci-
plinary procedure; it invites the prison administration to do so. And it
does not create a prison penal code; it invites the administration to do
so. On both the substantive and procedural issues of section 4 (with
one important exception-the right to counsel) the Model Act does
not even go as far as the leading cases in the area. 9
In providing for counsel at a disciplinary hearing which may af-
fect the prisoner's sentence or eligibility for parole, the Model Act
does take a step beyond existing statutory and case law.10 But it
makes no provision for legal assistance for prisoner litigation; the
draftsmen indicate in the Introduction to the Model Act that this is
because "the drafters of model legislation for public defender services
have failed to include the obligation to assist prisoners."-" Given this
position on suits involving legal challenges to conviction and, presum-
ably, to conditions of confinement, it seems paradoxical to create an
affirmative right to counsel at disciplinary hearings.
Whether the Model Act intends to limit participation to counsel who
either are retained or volunteer is not indicated.' 2 What is clear
9. For a general discussion of these cases, as well as the limits of seeking change
through procedural devices, see Cohen, The Discovery of Prison Reform, 21 BurrALo
L. REv. 855 (1972).
10. In Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971), for example,
the court required that counsel be afforded prisoners accused of an offense which could
result in criminal penalties. In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), aff'g it
part and rev'g in part Gunsolus v. Gagnon, 454 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1971), the Supreme
Court extended the rule of Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), which established
the right to a hearing for revocation of parole, to revocation of probation. The Court
held, however, that the right to appointed counsel at revocation of probation and
parole hearings is to be decided on a case-by-case basis, thus reversing the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, which had established a per se constitutional right to ap-
pointed counsel. 454 F.2d at 421-23.
In conducting research in California prisons during the summer of 1972, I was
led to believe that if a criminal proceeding was contemplated, the prisoner was placed
in segregation and the matter referred to the local prosecutor. In observing disciplinary
hearings at the prison in San Quentin, including one involving a homicide suspect
whom the district attorney refused to prosecute, only counsel "substitutes" (guards)
were provided.
11. The Need for a Statute, in MODEL AcT 9, 14 [hereinafter referred to and cited
as Introduction].
12. The equal protection question obviously lurks in the background. See Earnest
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss3/7
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is that nothing is said about the matter and, thus, if a right to have
counsel appointed were intended (and that seems doubtful) the Model
Act can hardly be characterized as having provided a powerful in-
ducement or rationale for such a step. More basically, simply pasting
in a right to be represented by counsel, and surrounding it with a
vague mixture of substantive and procedural items and the need to
maintain disciplinary records, 13 is representative of the Model Act's
architectural and substantive failures.
Section 6, "Judicial Relief," reiterates judicial remedies that already
are available to prisoners who allege abuses, but, for no apparent rea-
son, fails to mention the possibility of recovering money damages in a
civil suit.' 4  That the federal law concerning the recovery of money
damages is clearer and better developed than the law in most states
only dramatizes the need to address the issue in model legislation
which is presumably directed to the states.
The same section permits the appropriate court to issue injunctions,
prohibit further commitments, or even close an institution (subject to a
stay not to exceed six months) if extensive and persistent abuses are
found."5 Closing an institution, or even prohibiting further commit-
ments, is, of course, a drastic remedy whether it be based on constitu-
tional or statutory provisions. It should be clear that state courts,
even with an authorizing statute, will be most reluctant to consider
such a remedy and lawyers would be well-advised to continue to use
v. Willingham, 406 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1969) (if retained counsel is permitted by
statute to appear at hearings for revocation of mandatory early release, impoverished
inmates must be provided with appointed counsel); Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp.
1062 (M.D. Fla. 1973) (inmates must be allowed to retain counsel, or to have the
assistance of a voluntary counsel substitute, in a prison disciplinary proceeding).
See also Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 654 (E.D. Va. 1971), modified, 354
F. Supp. 1292 (E.D. Va.), supplemented, 354 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Va. 1973).
13. See generally Harvard Center for Criminal Justice, Judicial Intervention in
Prison Discipline, 63 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 200, 208-09 (1972).
14. See Hellerstein, Remedies in Prisoners' Rights Litigation, in NATIONAL LEGAL
AID AND DEFENDER AssOCIATION, SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE 50TH ANNUAL
CONFERENCE 34, 38-40 (1972) (list of eighteen cases dealing with ordinary tort
damages, as well as punitive, compensatory, and nominal damages).
15. Section 6 would also permit the discharge of some prisoners, if they
have no history of serious assaultive behavior. There is no explicit reference to
holding an administrator in contempt for failure to "keep and hold safely" the pris-
oner. See State v. Brant, 99 R.I. 583, 589, 209 A.2d 455, 458 (1965). Section 6(b)
does, however, allow for "any other appropriate remedy in law or equity," and it may
have been intended that the more exotic remedies would be covered by this catch-all
language.
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federal law and "cruel and unusual punishment" claims to rectify such
abuses."0
The final provision of the Model Act, "Visits to Prisoners and Insti-
tutions," designates three categories of visitors: (1) attorneys of rec-
ord, relatives, and friends, who are to be governed by administrative
rules permitting visits and private talks "at reasonable times and under
reasonable limitations;" (2) state legislators, judges of criminal and
appellate courts, the attorney general, and the governor, any of whom
may visit the institution "at any time;"'17 and (3) all other citizens,
who may visit if they establish "a legitimate reason,"' 8 if their visit is
"not inconsistent with the public welfare and the safety and security of
the institution," and if the director is not of the view that "the visit or
any aspect thereof would be disruptive to the program of the institu-
tion."'19 One who is denied a visit may apply for a judicial order,
which is to be granted if it is found that: (1) the applicant is "a rep-
resentative of a public concern regarding the conditions of the prison;"
(2) he is not "a mere curiosity seeker;" and (3) the head of the in-
stitution has not established that "the visit, or any aspect of it, would
disrupt the program of the institution."2 °
16. See, e.g., Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub
nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972). For state cases, see Wayne
County Jail Inmates v. Wayne County Bd. Comm'rs, 1 PlusoN L. REP. 51 (Cir. Ct.
Wayne County, Mich. 1971), supplemented, 1 PIUSON L. REP. 186 (Cir. Ct. Wayne
County, Mich. 1972); Commonwealth ex rel. Bryant v. Hendrick, 444 Pa. 83, 280
A.2d 110 (1971). In a recent case, the Supreme Court held that prisoners who lose
"good time credits" as a result of a disciplinary hearing have their sole remedy under
the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970), and that equitable relief
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) is not available. Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475
(1973). The practical result of the decision is that a prisoner who claims that his
sentence has been unconstitutionally lengthened must exhaust his state remedies before
petitioning a federal court for relief. See generally Plotkin, Rotten to the "Core of
Habeas Corpus": The Supreme Court and the Limitations of a Prisoner's Right to
Sue: Preiser v. Rodriquez, 9 ClM. L. BuLL. 518 (1973).
17. Prosecutors may be displeased at their exclusion, but there probably is some
good, albeit undisclosed, reason for their omission from the list.
18. There are no criteria provided by the Model Act for establishing "a legiti-
mate reason."
19. MODEL ACT § 7.
20. Id. The use of the phrases "public concern" and "mere curiosity seeker" with-
out any attempt at definition or criteria simply stretches the limits of my credulity.
To base such an important right on undefined colloquialisms represents either gross
negligence or a cynical device designed to exclude anyone who does not meet the pri-
son administration's notions of acceptability. If the idea was to negate the blanket
prohibition against visits by persons with a criminal record and yet not open the insti-
tution for "trip to the zoo" visits, surely more precise language was available.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss3/7
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Again, there is so much that is wrong with what is included in this
section, and so much that is vital which is omitted, that one scarcely
knows where to begin.21 I view visiting rights as a bilateral situation,
and as a part of the larger issue of maintaining and even expanding
contact with the outside world. As such, how-and the extent to
which--one opens the institution is intimately related both to improv-
ing the current condition of the inmates and to bringing basic reform
to the prison. This area has a particularly strong claim to a statement
of principle and to precise rules which reflect that principle. I would
suggest, for example, the following statement of principle:
The treatment afforded prisoners should reflect the fact that their ex-
clusion from society is temporary. All rules concerning communication
and visiting must be designed to maintain, establish, and improve the
prisoners' relationships and contacts with the larger society. No person
may be denied the right to visit unless it is clearly established that his
presence would constitute a clear and present danger to security and
that no less restrictive alternative is available.22
But legislation in this area cannot be content merely with a state-
ment of principle and a directive to create administrative regulations.
Everything we know about prison administration shows that such
rights will be sparingly issued and grudgingly administered. Thus,
legislation must be based on a profound distrust for prison adminis-
tration and, in direct contrast to the Model Act, must seek to limit and
contain discretion-not to expand it. There must also be the further
recognition that however elegant the principle and however precise the
rules, those on the front lines retain the capacity for subversion.
23
Let us stipulate that the institution could not readily function with
unlimited visiting, although I believe the problems of security, admin-
istration, and program disruption in prisons are greatly exaggerated.24
21. Perhaps one place to begin is with a description of how visiting was handled
at New York's Attica Prison, and of how the indiscriminate recital of "security reasons"
and the use of such devices as "strip searches" and needless barriers amounted to sense-
less harassment and dehumanization. See ATTICA: THE OFFIcIL REPORT OF THE
NEW YORK STATE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON ATrICA 61-63 (Bantam ed. 1972).
22. The emphasis is on principle. A much more complete statement would be
required in legislation, including techniques for establishing the basis for exclusion and
permissible regulation of the visit itself.
23. See generally Rosett, Discretion, Severity and Legality in Criminal fustice,
46 S. CAL. L. REV. 12 (1972).
24. In considering the claims of persons awaiting trial, Judge Zirpoli wrote:
"Although unrestricted visiting might constitute an intolerable interference with or-
Vol. 1973:621]
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If visits are as important as I believe them to be--a view shared by
every inmate with whom I have talked-then only a clear and present
danger, and not mere administrative convenience, could justify an ex-
clusionary rule. Further, the right of the free person to visit, and the
right of the prisoner to be visited, should be viewed as first amend-
ment rights, and thus any demonstrable state interest should be weighed
against the availability of less restrictive alternatives.2 "Reasonable
times" and "reasonable limitations"-the language of the Model Act-
hardly approximates the "clear and present danger"-"least restrictive
alternative" approach suggested here.20
Section 7 is silent concerning the right of access to prisons by the
media. Although I recognize the danger of exploiting the plight of
the inmate, on balance, anyone who is concerned with prison reform
must also support maximal access by the media. Admittedly, this
may not be a right that is personal to any particular prisoner, but I
would argue that it is a right inherent in the class of prisoners. That
is, prisoners suffer in common the deprivations of prison, although not
all will necessarily suffer from all prison conditions. Thus, the right
to communicate effectively is a right arguably held by all.27
II. ORIGINS
By now, it will come as no surprise to the reader that I find it
nearly impossible to understand why the National Council on Crime
and Delinquency (NCCD) elected to prepare and promulgate the
Model Act. To this point I have attempted to impart my general im-
pressions of the Model Act as well as an overall view of its content.
In this section I will deal with issues relating to its preparation and
intent.
derly jail administration [existing practice should be liberalized]." Brennemen v.
Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 141 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
25. There have been very few judicial considerations of a constitutional right to
visit, and they do not support the views expressed here. See SOUTH CAROLINA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONs, THE EMERGING RIGHTS OF THE CONFINED 76, 77 (1972).
26. A major concern of prison officials is the smuggling of contraband. When I
visited California's San Quentin Prison in July 1972, I was forced to pass through an
electronic device so sensitive to metal that an alarm sounded in response to the metal
foil wrapper in my package of cigarettes. This is a very effective, yet less restrictive,
alternative.
27. Although this may be regarded as either a flawed or exotic first amendment
argument, depending on one's point of view, in the enterprise of drafting and promul-
gating a code it is the correctness of the policy, not constitutional disputation, which
matters.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss3/7
PRISONERS' RIGHTS
The composition of the committee which prepared the Model Act
provides some clue to its scope and content; it is heavily weighted with
persons connected with prison management .2  Indeed, Norman Carl-
son, Director of the United States Bureau of Prisons and a member of
the drafting committee, recently was held in contempt for disobeying a
court order that members of the Church of the New Song be accorded
the right of free exercise of their religion in prison.29 On the other
hand, Sol Rubin, who shortly will retire as Counsel for NCCD, oper-
ated as staff representative to the committee and brought years of ex-
perience and commitment to prison reform to the task. Without hav-
ing any inside information concerning what occurred, I suspect that
Rubin was simply overruled by other members of the committee on
key issues.
For example, on the issue of censorship Rubin wrote, in October
1971: "Is it really necessary to exercise the control over correspon-
dence and reading that is typical in institutions?"3 °  He cited with ap-
proval an article3 which takes the view that restriction on expression
requires not only a valid social purpose, but also the absence of a reason-
able alternative which is less destructive of free expression. On the
specific question of control over correspondence and reading matter in
prison, Rubin indicated that "a statute could help."'32  Yet, although
28. The Committee for a Model Act for the Protection of Rights of Prisoners
[hereinafter referred to as the committee] was composed of the following members:
1. Norman Carlson, Director, Bureau of Prisons, United States Department of
Justice
2. Major John D. Case, Warden, Bucks County Prison, Doylestown, Pennsylvania
3. Joseph S. Coughlin, Assistant Director, Illinois Department of Corrections
4. Walter W. Finke, Chairman of the Board, Dictaphone Corporation; Mem-
ber, Board of Trustees, NCCD
5. Dr. Peter Lejins, Director, Institute of Criminal Justice and Criminology, Uni-
versity of Maryland
6. Richard A. McGee, President, American Justice Institute
7. Dr. Karl Menninger, The Menninger Foundation
8. Dr. Elmer K. Nelson, Director, School of Public Administration, University of
Southern California
9. Judge George H. Revelle, Superior Court, Seattle, Washington
10. Sol Rubin, Counsel. NCCD
29. Theriault v. Carlson, 353 F. Supp. 1061 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
30. Rubin, Needed-New Legislation in Correction, 17 CRiME & DELINQUENCY
392 (1971).
31. Note, The Right of Expression in Prison, 40 S. CAL. L. Rlv. 407, 408-11
(1967).
32. Rubin, supra note 30, at 402.
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there is discussion of censorship in the Introduction,3" there is no men-
tion in the Model Act itself of censorship of mail or access to publica-
tions. Why this is so, particularly since the Introduction makes
some strong statements against censorship,34 is not apparent.
There are two possible explanations for this omission, other than
the committee's possible disposition against expanding prisoners'
rights. First, the Introduction states: "Briefly this act states the most
onerous abuses occurring in prisons and specifies the courts' powers
to deal with them."35  An inference can be drawn that the committee,
despite its strong prefatory statements in opposition to most censorship,
was of the view that censorship was simply not among these "most
onerous abuses," and therefore was not worthy of proscription in the
Model Act. This inference renders the Introduction utterly inconsist-
ent with the draft, but at least it enables one to obtain a feel for the
committee's priorities. Secondly, another, perhaps more reasonable,
possibility is that in pursuit of the principle of parsimony, the commit-
tee meant to encompass censorship issues under the central principle
that prisoners retain all rights "except those expressly or by necessary
implication taken by law.' 36  If this is the case, consistency of the
Introduction with the Model Act is achieved at a dear price. Since
the same section lists, by way of example, some of the rights intended
to be expressed by the central principle, the doctrine of expressio
unius est exclusio alterius is needlessly confronted if the Model Act
was intended to encompass censorship.
The absence of a provision on censorship is particularly significant
since the law on first amendment rights concerning the mail, books,
and periodicals of prisoners is in a state of flux.37 Surely the commit-
tee realized this. If a "model act" does not take a position on an is-
sue that all would agree is vital and relevant, particularly when that
issue is being debated at the levels of both principle and detail, it is
at least misleading for such an act to adopt the appellation "model."
In the area of asserted first amendment rights of prisoners, courts
have begun to articulate a standard to be applied in assessing censor-
33. Introduction 10.
34. E.g., id.: "[Clensorship, often needless and degrading, as well as burdensome
to the institution ......
35. Id. at 11.
36. MODEL Act § 1(a).
37. Compare Brown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 1228, 1231 (4th Cir. 1971), with For-
tune Soc'y v. McGinnis, 319 F. Supp. 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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ship: To be upheld, a regulation must be required by a demonstrable,
compelling state interest, and the method of censorship selected must
be the least drastic alternative available to effectuate that interest.38
Occasionally, a "clear and present danger" test is stated as an alterna-
tive to the "compelling state interest" test.39 Quite recently, however,
in Morales v. Schmidt ° the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals took
aim at this liberalizing trend and reversed, both on doctrine and re-
suit, one of the most enlightened decisions on point ever reached by
any court. The court stated: "We hold that the Constitution does not
require a State to show a compelling interest when it seeks to restrict a
prisoner's or parolee's associations or written communications with per-
sons who are not judges, lawyers, or governmental officials. 41  In-
stead, the court substituted a far less onerous standard: whether the
action contemplated bears a "reasonable relationship to" or is "reason-
ably necessary for" the advancement of a justifiable purpose of the
state.4 2
These competing principles on the issue of censorship are men-
tioned here not in a spirit of debate on the merits, but to give more
concrete expression to my wholesale criticism of the Model Act. In
sum, I can find no reasonable explanation for its failure to take a
position on a matter as vital as censorship,43 and on other vital is-
sues.4 4  It appears either that the conservative element of the com-
mittee overruled Rubin, or that, faced with an inability to resolve basic
differences on key issues, the committee simply left out provisions
dealing with them.
III. ARCHITECTURE
On a point more basic than the inclusion or exclusion of particular
issues, Sol Rubin has written that "a correctional statute cannot be
called modern unless it does control discretion, unless there is super-
38. See, e.g., Rowland v. Jones, 452 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir.), affg Rowland v.
Sigler, 327 F. Supp. 821 (D. Neb. 1971).
39. See Fortune Soc'y v. McGinnis, 319 F. Supp. 901, 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
40. - F.2d - (7th Cir. 1973), rev'g 340 F. Supp. 544 (W.D. Wis. 1972).
41. Id. at-.
42. Id.
43. That the area falls within the boundaries of the United States Consti-
tution obviously is no reason for the exclusion, particularly since most of the Model
Act deals with matters of constitutional magnitude, for example, cruel and unusual
punishment, procedural due process, and freedom of religion.
44. See notes 53-83 infra and accompanying text.
Vol. 1973:621]
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vision of the quality of the work done." 45 Measured by that standard
alone, the Model Act should not commend itself to anyone. The con-
clusion is inescapable that the architecture of the Model Act is such
that administrative discretion is to be maximized. Indeed, it seems
fair to say that the Model Act evidences a desire to win back some of
the discretion lost in recent prisoners' rights litigation.
The issue of discretion illustrates the difficulty the Model Act has in
striking a balance between the general and the particular. Although
the Model Act is reasonably clear on some specific issues, these issues
appear to have been idiosyncratically selected from among the many
important questions which have reached the courts. And the Model
Act articulates some abstract principles; one can, for example, locate
the "rights not losf' principle, the effort to link procedural require-
ments in disciplinary hearings to the seriousness of the possible sanc-
tion, and the requirement that prison administrators draft a prison
penal code and in so doing pursue "fairness and equity"--but that is
all.
Anyone who has attempted to prepare a code has encountered this
problem of how to obtain a proper mix between the general and the
particular. Policymakers and draftsmen typically are advised to "take
care to avoid, on the one hand, that degree of generality which makes
for vagueness and uncertainty and, on the other, that degree of par-
ticularity which overcomplicates the text and strait-jackets the admin-
istrator . . . . 4 Preparation of a model act raises the question of
generality versus particularity, but in a somewhat different fashion
than the preparation of legislation designed for immediate adoption in
a particular jurisdiction.
It is theoretically possible to draft a model act on prisoners' rights
that stated only abstract principles from which basic provisions could
be deduced. This, despite its shortcomings, would be considerably
more valuable than the present Model Act. The abstract principle
approach might include provisions such as the following: no rights
shall be lost except those inherent in the condition of confinement
(namely, restrictions on physical movement); no rights shall be re-
stricted or modified except in pursuit of a valid penal objective or
state interest, and such objective or interest must be specific, immedi-
ate, and reasonable; the least drastic alternative must be employed to
45. Rubin, supra note 30, at 394 (emphasis original).
46. R. DICKERSON, LEGISLATIVE DRAFnNG § 1.4 (1954).
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achieve any such objective or interest; the specific provisions adopted
in pursuance of these principles must reflect the fact that incarceration
is itself the legally imposed sanction and any additional deprivation or
restraint is not favored; and autonomy and responsibility shall inhere
in each prisoner, and any general rule or regulation, or specific appli-
cation thereof, affecting his autonomy or responsibility shall be sub-
ject to special rules (to be enacted) governing such exceptions to the
general rule.47
A second design for a model code-the one usually adopted, and
perhaps best exemplified by the highly influential Model Penal Code48
-is an integration of principles, doctrines, and rules. Clearly, the
Model Act does not opt for this approach. The Introduction indicates
that the Model Act has only a limited purpose: it does not prescribe
treatment programs; it does not deal with inspection and possible clo-
sure by administrators; it does not detail procedures for litigation
brought by inmates; and it does not deal with inmate legal assistance.49
Also, in referring to other NCCD proposals the Introduction states:
"These statutes are the proper locale for a direct statement of prac-
tices that are prohibited (e.g., corporal punishment forbidden in the
Standard Act for Correctional Services) and practices that must be
regulated (e.g., solitary confinement-specifically, the conditions gov-
erning its use)." 50
What the Model Act has done is to articulate a few principles, and
surround them with specific provisions which either prohibit or regu-
late a limited number of practices which occur in prison. Thus, in
terms of architecture the Model Act is neither an exhaustive set of
principles nor an integration of abstractions and logically connected
specifics. Measured by its own terms--or more accurately, by infer-
ences derived from the Introduction-it sets out to articulate only "the
most onerous abuses occurring in prisons and specifies the courts'
,powers to deal with them."51
47. I trust it is clear that my suggested principles are intended neither to be
exhaustive nor comprehensive, and that I believe such an approach has real value only
when linked to specific provisos.
48. MODEL PENAL CODE (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
49. Introduction 13-14. Why it was thought necessary to indicate the exclusion
of judicial procedure without explaining the failure to deal in detail with institutional
procedure is another subtlety which eludes me.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 11.
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Thus, as I have suggested previously, any principle or specific pro-
vision which is omitted raises both a serious question concerning the
intent of the draftsmen, and an implication of rejection. Since the area
of prisioners' rights is an expanding and explosive one, we are not
entirely in the dark concerning the nature of the issues. 2  Given the
composition of the committee and that the staff included Sol Rubin
(who clearly knows the case law in the area), it is unreasonable to as-
sume that the omissions occurred from ignorance.
IV. THE SINS OF OMISSION
In an earlier article I set out to explore the limitations of litigation
Jn bringing about basic prison reform. 3  There, I suggested that
tactics of reform could easily become confused with objectives, and
that litigators might frame questions in such a way that while the
answers were clear, the possibility of achieving desirable change might
remain problematic. 4 It seemed important then-and it seems no
less important now-to insist on the clarification of goals, along with
greater definitional precision and a separation of goals from tactics."
Similar questions must be raised about legislation, particularly leg-
iislation that cloaks itself with the appellation "model." If the Model
Act undertakes to do any more than bring a modicum of humanity
through civilized standards to uncivilized institutions, the effort is so
far disguised as to escape my attention. Indeed, as I have suggested,
it scarcely goes beyond existing case law in its particulars, and is re-
gressive in its omissions.
This limitation in scope is critical in light of the advances produced
by litigation. In the area of prisoners' rights we have witnessed the
virtual end of the restrictive "hands off" doctrine, 50 . and from the
52. The total number of state and federal prisoner complaints filed in the lower
federal courts in 1971 was 16,266. Indeed, the growth has been so rapid that one
group, the so-called Freund Committee, has recommended establishing a non-
judicial body whose members would investigate and report on both collateral at-
tacks on convictions and complaints of mistreatment in prison. This procedure is to
be available before the filing of a petition in federal court, and presumably to be sub-
ject to an "exhaustion" rule. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP
ON THE CAsE LOAD OF Tm SUrPREME COURT 13, 47 (1972).
53. Cohen, The Discovery of Prison Reform, 21 BUFFALO L. REv. 855 (1972).
54. Id. at 856.
55. Id. at 883.
56. See Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to
Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963).
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earliest lines of cases the issues-access to the courts, cruel and un-
usual punishments, and freedom of religion-have expanded and
have been somewhat clarified. But it seems axiomatic that litigation
is inherently more limited than legislation; in the movement for prison-
ers' rights and prison reform the time would appear to be right for
model legislation which carries forward the objectives of reform estab-
lished by litigation.
Yet, even assuming that the Model Act silently draws a distinction
between prison reform and prisoners' rights, and opts for a limited
coverage of the latter, a number of issues have been excluded that in
my mind are among "the most onerous abuses occurring in the
prisons. 57  I have previously discussed the failure of the Model Act
to deal with first amendment issues; here, I wish only to reiterate the
point with respect to other significant omissions.
A. Disciplinary Proceedings
The early decisions involving prisoners' rights (with the notable ex-
ception of the right of access to the courts) were almost exclusively
concerned with humanizing the conditions of confinement.5 8 More
recently, the courts have been most responsive to prisoners' claims to
fair procedure in disciplinary proceedings.50 The appeal for legal
ceremony in disciplinary proceedings is powerful, and the analogical
precedents handy: something of value is subject to be taken away;
there is a charge, an effort to present facts, and then an effort to arrive
at a suitable disposition. With analogues like Goldberg v. Kelly60 in
welfare law, and Morrissey v. Brewer6' on parole revocation, empha-
sizing, respectively, "grievous loss" and "loss of liberty," the potential
deprivations involved in a disciplinary proceeding arguably require
due process. Indeed, the formula which emerges from the cases is
this: The more serious the possible loss, the greater the claim to pro-
cedural safeguards. It must be noted, however, that procedural safe-
guards can do no more than regularize, and perhaps humanize, the
inside operation of the prison.
57. Introduction 11.
58. See F. ComEN, supra note 7, at 64-77.
59. See cases discussed in SouTH CARoLINA DEPARTMENT OF COnRRcEONS, supra
note 25, at 101-13.
60. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
61. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
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A number of courts have come to grips with the problem of linking
a procedural format to the nature of the conduct involved and the
possible sanctions which may be imposed. In the development of a
procedural format the courts have specified the rights to notice of the
charges, to a hearing, to cross-examination, to a decision based on
evidence presented at the hearing, to some form of representation, and
to an impartial tribunal. 62
Maintaining an impartial tribunal is one of the most vexing prob-
lems encountered in the effort to bring a modicum of fairness to
disciplinary proceedings. 3 Impartiality typically is to be achieved by
the elimination from the tribunal of anyone--certainly including the
reporting officer-with personal knowledge of any material fact, and
anyone charged with subsequent review of any decision. 4 However
laudable the intention of the courts imposing such a rule, so long as
members of a disciplinary tribunal are selected either from the treat-
ment or custodial staff, the closed nature of the prison world makes it
inevitable that they will have knowledge either of the event or the in-
mate. A vigorous defense can easily result in reprisals. Bias and the
need to support colleagues are inherent in the process.Or
It must be clear that unless there is a fair opportunity to persuade
an impartial decision-maker, any hearing is merely ceremonial. Hear-
ings and procedures are designed to achieve rationality, visibility, par-
ticipation accuracy in fact-findings, and a logical nexus between the
facts found, the applicable norm, and the conclusions reached. Ulti-
mately, the parties involved-particularly the one proceeded against-
must have a fair chance to influence the result. This, I suggest, can
never be the case when institutional personnel sit in judgment one
moment and drink coffee with the accusers the next."'
I do not mean to suggest that it is a simple matter to devise and
62. See, e.g., Collins v. Schoonfield, 344 F. Supp. 257 (D. Md. 1972) (jail case);
Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971), modified, 354 F. Supp. 1292
(E.D. Va.), supplemented, 354 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Va. 1973); Clutchette v. Procunier,
328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Morris v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.I.
1970).
63. Harvard Center for Criminal Justice, supra note 13, at 210.
64. Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767, 784 (N.D. Cal. 1971); see
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1972) (revocation of parole).
65. Harvard Center for Criminal Justice, supra note 13, at 225.
66. This comment may evoke an image of defense attorney and prosecutor
leaving a courtroom after a bruising day and sharing a drink and some shoptalk.
Only when the judge and jury join them and also regularly share a work experience is
the attempted analogue complete.
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implement the workings of a truly impartial tribunal. I do mean to
state emphatically that a model act is the place to confront and attempt
to resolve the question. It may be that outside hearing examiners
should be used, or volunteer lawyers sitting as a panel, or labor ar-
bitrators. These are alternatives that can be most easily investigated
in the preparation of a model act, where expertise and resources are
available. But the Model Act leaves the problem within the discre-
tion of prison officials, virtually without guidance.67
B. Personal Appearance
One of the most devastating aspects of incarceration is the in-
mate's loss of identity or, in Goffman's words, "personal defacement." 8
On admission the inmate is stripped of his usual appearance and of
the equipment and services by which he maintains the sense of per-
sonal identity he seeks to present to the world. Prisoners are viewed
as fungible items; they must dress alike, keep their hair at a pre-
cribed length, and not grow beards or mustaches. Why? Prison offi-
cials in California explained to me that individuality in dress or ap-
pearance creates a security problem: let a man grow a beard and he
may shave it and require a new identification picture; a beardless pris-
oner might acquire a false beard and stroll out the gate unnoticed. 69
Therefore, in California's prisons there are strict rules concerning
dress and hair, and guards seem to spend considerable time making
certain that a prisoner's sideburns are not below his ears or that his
hair is not below his collar. In walking through the California prisons
one of my first and lasting impressions was the dulling sameness in the
appearance of the inmates, adding to my already keen sense of unreal-
ity created by seeing thousands of men in cages enclosed by massive
walls.
71
67. One might contrast the style of restatements with the style of model acts.
A restatement may lay claim to no more than an accurate summary and orderly
statement of what is. My vision of a model act is a document which attempts to go
beyond the existing law as well as to resolve conflicts; in effect, it is a document de-
signed to set a pace.
68. Goffman, On the Characteristics of Total Institutions: The Inmate World,
in PERSPECrIVES ON CORRECTION 31, 39 (D. MacNamara & E. Sagarin eds. 1971).
69. The other stock reasons are that a weapon may be concealed in the hair
(usually citing the dubious charge that George Jackson concealed a gun in his "Afro"),
and that personal hygiene requires it.
70. Shortly after visiting the California prisons, I spent several days in the Maine
prisons. In the only maximum security prison there, inmates were given great free-
dom as to their personal appearance. I saw men with closely cropped hair and
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There is very little law in this area, and what does exist is almost
uniformly adverse to the prisoners' interests, although with conflicting
rationales. The courts have been consistently insensitive to the so-
cio-psychological importance of individuality in personal appearance,
preferring regularity and order to heterogeneity. Inmates have based
their claims on constitutional grounds-the right of privacy, the right
of expression, freedom of religion, and equal protection 7 1-to no
avail.7 2
These claims have no better reception in the Model Act. The
courts, at least, have ruled on the questions; the Model Act is silent. 3
Again, the explanation may be that the matter was intended to come
within the central principle that prisoners retain all rights except those
taken by law.74  This, of course, only further avoids the issue. There
must first be established a general constitutional right to particular
aspects of personal appearance, and then the matter must be re-
solved within the particular institutional setting on a balancing-of-
interests approach. Schools"5 and the military,7 6 for example, have
been loci for such claims.
At the risk of undue repetition, but in the hope of making the point
indelible: It is inconceivable to me that the Model Act does not deal
with such an issue. In the belief that I have noted important sins of
omission and supported them adequately to this point, for the re-
mainder of this section I will simply note other conspicuous omissions.
clean-shaven faces and men with luxuriant beards and hair which fell to the middle of
their backs. No one reported any security problems. Women could wear their hair
any way they desired, and the state provided a clothing allowance which enabled them
to select their own clothing. The contrast with California was, of course, startling.
71. SouTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CoRRcTnoNs, supra note 25, at 96.
72. In Seale v. Manson, 326 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Conn. 1971), the court ruled that
a pre-trial detainee had a right to wear a beard, and that the justification of a health
hazard had not been established. In Collins v. Schoonfield, 344 F. Supp. 257,
271-72 (D. Md. 1972), the court held that while it may not be unconstitutional to re-
quire post-trial detainees to conform to definite and reasonable hair-style regulations,
the permissible range of such regulations is far narrower for pre-trial detainees.
73. Indeed, in § 1(b)-the representative, but not exhaustive, listing of pris-
oners' rights-there is no mention of a right to adequate, let alone individualized,
clothing.
74. MoDEL ACT § 1(a).
75. See Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989
(1972).
76. See Raderman v. Kaine, 411 F.2d 1102 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 976
(1969).
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C. Miscellaneous Omissions
A model act should contain a fairly complete definitions section.
Terms like "solitary confinement," "discipline," "infraction," "order,"
and "security" can be easily manipulated and abused. Statutory defi-
nitions obviously are no panacea, but surely they would aid an ad-
ministrator who wants to follow the law, and would provide a modest
amount of certainty to inmates.
Rights relating to correspondence, to the receipt and retention of
literature, to visiting and to being visited, to meeting with the media,
to preparing and publishing material, and to forming associations, are
vital to the prison reform movement and to improving the daily life of
the prisoner. They are important because they allow some of the out-
side world to seep into the institution, and they allow a sense of the
horror of incarceration, even without access to the forbidden world of
isolation cells and adjustment centers, to filter back to the outside
world. There is a breach in the prison's wall of sensory deprivation
and total control of information.77  The Model Act has too little to say
about these first amendment issues.
The issue of special diets for inmates with particular religious views
or, even more clearly, with medical dietary requirements, should have
been included.7 8  Dietary issues have been debated and litigated to
the point where a reasonable legislative provision could have been
drafted.
The Model Act should have been far more specific on conditions
of living, and should have taken a position on the inmates' right to
personal and habitational privacy.79 Among the items that should
have been included are: the right to a mattress-type bed and linen;
the right to individual, non-hazardous room or cell decorations; and
the right to an explicit number of showers or baths, with a special
proviso for those engaged in particularly messy work.
77. STANDARD Mn mwm RULES, supra note 7, at pt. 1, §§ 37-39, includes a
right to correspond and to receive mail and a right to be kept regularly informed of
important news items by reading and by listening to the radio. See also AmRcAN
CoRRErnoNAL ASSOCIATION, MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS ch. 15, rule 9 (3d
ed. 1966).
78. See Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (dealing with the
Muslim prohibition against eating pork, or even vegetables seasoned with pork, and
utilizing the "least restrictive alternative" approach).
79. In § 1(a) a grudging fifty square feet of floor space in any confined
sleeping area is established.
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The unrestricted and demeaning use of "strip searches" and peri-
odic security shakedowns of cells is part, in a prisoner's words, of
"the psychological warfare which the guards use to terrorize and
harass you .... [T he Fourth Amendment . . . does not apply
and if you value your head in its natural state, it is best not to men-
tion it."80  It is unlikely that anyone will seriously move to forbid all
searches for weapons or contraband in prison situations. But at the
same time, with the multiplicity of deprivations already imposed by in-
carceration, it is clearly an appropriate time to begin to flesh out at least
an outline of a right of privacy for inmates."' There are obvious prob-
lems in stating the grounds and procedure for a lawful search but, facing
a "no rights" area, the Model Act might have taken a hesitant step in
the right direction. 2
Information is power, and prisons, like all incarcerating institutions,
claim an exclusive right to shape and share information concerning
their inmates. A prisoner's right to obtain access to his file and to
shape it with his own inputs is, admittedly, a more sophisticated, al-
though no less troublesome, issue than privacy. But an inmate is, in
effect, a file; he is an object whose history is recorded in some de-
tail. Decisions as vital as parole, classification, transfer, job assign-
ment, and security status hinge on the state of a file that an inmate
ordinarily has no right to see or to shape. The Model Act might well
have undertaken to provide criteria and procedures for obtaining ac-
cess to the file and for establishing a right of input.
The opportunity to earn and save money while in prison is a basic
issue. Indeed, in terms of a possible reduction in the risk of recidi-
vism, this may be as significant as any other item discussed in this article.
Prisoners are clamoring for the legal right to a faii wage for indus-
trial as well as institutional maintenance work. 88  The Model Act
80. Muntu, Inside San Quentin-At the Mercy of the Merciless, VILLAGE Voicn,
Oct. 14, 1971, at 12, reprinted in Hearings on Corrections Before Subcomm, No. 3 of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 15, pt. 2, at 312, 316
(1971).
81. UNITED PIsoNmRS UNION, BILL OF RIGHTS art. 1, § VII, demands full protec-
tion against illegal searches and seizures and invasions of privacy during incarceration
and parole.
82. In describing this as a "no rights" area, I mean to distinguish it from other
areas either encompassed by, or excluded from, the Model Act where there is some law.
A "no rights" situation in which the problem has surfaced presents a clear candidate for
inclusion in a model act.
83. There is a separate problem in seeking to encourage further schooling but pro-
viding no, or very little, compensation for such activity.
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should have addressed the issue and established minimal guidelines for
implementing a right to fair compensation.
The Model Act should also have addressed the thorny questions of
classification and transfer of prisoners, of a right to sexual opportuni-
ties, and of access to a law library and the conditions of its use. Also,
as work-release and furlough programs continue to gain popularity,
there is an obvious need for rules dealing with eligibility for and con-
tinuation in these programs. Once again, the Model Act is silent.
V. CONCLUSION
Having addressed questions of principle, architecture, and detail, it
is obvious that I view the Model Act as a failure. Had it undertaken
to provide guidance to correctional administrators in the adoption of
standard administrative rules and procedures, I would have disagreed
on principle with the notion of achieving change in that fashion.s 4
But a well-conceived and comprehensive effort in that direction would
have carried with it a sense of integrity, a vision of change that
would at least be debatable.
I find myself thinking back to the original invitation of the Law
Quarterly to contribute to this symposium. The invitation came and
I accepted it before I saw the Model Act. Having much respect and
affection for Sol Rubin, and knowing that he was bound to be as-
sociated with the Model Act, I was hardly prepared for what I en-
countered s5 This is not the type of article one particularly enjoys
doing. On the other hand, the Model Act is so devoid of any redeem-
ing social utility that I wish it had never been prepared and pub-
lished; its adoption would do nothing for the prison reform move-
84. Existing statutes delegate to the department of corrections the general author-
ity to supervise and manage the state's correctional system, and also invite or require
the enactment of rules and regulations to accomplish ihat end. Few states have at-
tempted to enact administrative rules that are comprehensive even in a single area, let
alone the entire area. The Model Act will provide no guidance to administrators
anxious to maintain control through the enactment of administrative rules. For a typi-
cal statutory provision, see Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 221.040, 221.120, 221.320 (1969).
For a general discussion of this topic, see W. Fitch, Structuring Correctional Decision
Making: A Traditional Proposal, Jan. 15, 1973 (unpublished thesis on file at State
University of New York at Albany, School of Criminal Justice).
85. I believe that Sol Rubin is the person most responsible for the current era of
legal concern not only for the rights of prisoners but for all who are caught up in the
system. As I indicated earlier, I find it difficult to believe that the Model Act is re-
flective of his thinking.
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ment, and very little for the men and women in the, cages we call
prisons.8 6
86. For a comprehensive effort to establish guidelines for prison administration,
see BOSTON UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, MODEL RULES AND REGULA-
TIONS ON PRISONERS' RIGHTS AND REsPONSMILITIES (1973). The book was released
after the preparation of this article, and deserves careful consideration.
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